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This project analyzes the various opinions in the United States of Adolf Hitler and the 
Nazis during the 1930s and studies the amount of information that was available in the United 
States regarding Nazi Germany before entering World War II. Specifically, it seeks to 
understand why the United States did relatively little to influence German and European affairs 
even in the face of increasing Nazi brutality and bellicosity. The analysis has been divided into 
three different categories. The first focuses on the United States government, and the President 
and Secretary of State in particular. The second category analyzes the minority opinion in the 
United States that had Nazi sympathies. Finally, the third deals with the American public in 
general.   
 The evidence suggests that there was enough information regarding Nazi Germany for 
Americans to make a reasonable judgment.  Most of the United States was opposed to Nazism 
and the German government.  In spite of this, the majority agreed that the United States should 
not intervene or enter war.  This study is significant because it helps shed further light on a 
debate in the country that continues to the present day: what role should the United States have 
when it comes to world affairs? The research in this thesis suggests that, in spite of opposition by 
the American public, if there is enough verifiable evidence of a humanitarian crisis to justify 
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On January 30th, 1933, Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of Germany.  With this 
appointment came the death of the Weimar Republic and the birth of the Third Reich.1  
Oftentimes, seemingly insignificant events drastically change the path of history.  The selection 
of Hitler as Chancellor is one such example.  His rise to power confirmed for him and his 
followers their quest to fulfill the goals of the National Socialist Party, the Nazis.  It gave them 
the opportunity to essentially overthrow the government of the Weimar Republic and turn 
Germany into a Nazi state. 
 Almost immediately after Hitler became Chancellor, he and his cohort, Hermann Göring, 
in an attempt for the Nazi Party to gain more control of the government, called for an immediate 
dissolution of the Reichstag, the German parliament.  Using the arson attack on the Reichstag 
days later to their advantage, they blamed the members of the Communist Party for the crime 
and succeeded at passing a decree that eliminated the civil rights of the German people 
indefinitely and gave the Reich government the power to intervene to restore order in the 
German states.  The latter section of the decree was ultimately used by the Nazis to round up 
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political enemies and, in coordination with a well-planned propaganda campaign, it finally gave 
the Nazis full control of the country.2  
 As the Third Reich continued along its course, the Nazis began carrying out their plans 
for an Aryan empire.  Any opposition to their increasingly tyrannical regime proved futile.  
Violence against Jews in Germany steadily increased.  They were discriminated against and 
persecuted.  In foreign affairs, Nazi Germany began a campaign to conquer neighboring regions 
and incorporate them into the Lebensraum (living-space) of the Germans.3  First, it began a 
program of rearmament, followed by the invasion and conquest of the Rhineland; both actions 
broke rules established in the Treaty of Versailles.  Next, Nazi Germany annexed Austria to the 
empire.  Then it claimed the German region of Czechoslovakia called the Sudetenland and 
afterward conquered all of Czechoslovakia.  And finally, it invaded Poland, causing the Allied 
forces of Britain and France to declare war.4 
 The Third Reich played a significant role in World War II.  Since the end of the war, 
there has been debate over the amount of blame Nazi Germany deserves.5  Regardless, it is 
certain that the Third Reich greatly influenced the war and its outcomes.   The war lasted about 
six years, from the fall of 1939 to the spring of 1945.  It was not until Hitler committed suicide in 
April of 1945 and Germany surrendered in May of that year that the war in the European theater 
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ended.6  Within those six years, Germany, along with the other Axis powers, threatened to 
dominate Europe.  The war resulted in a death toll as high as seventy million, about half of them 
suffered by Europe.  In addition, about five in seven of those killed were civilians.7  Along with 
the war came the Holocaust, Germany’s Final Solution to their so-called Jewish problem.  Over 
six million Jews died in the Nazi’s genocide alongside millions of others, including gypsies, non-
Aryans, and undesirables.8 
 In light of all this, this investigation will examine the role of the United States in the 
general state of inactivity when dealing with Hitler and Nazi Germany before World War II.  
There seems to be much more literature that exists on the other Allies’ views of Nazi Germany 
than America’s opinions.  This is probably due to direct involvement of Britain and France, 
among other countries, in talks and negotiations with the Third Reich.  Less has been written 
about the United States before World War II in relation to Nazi Germany; this is likely because 
of the lack of direct involvement in dealing with Germany.  Also, in histories of the 1930s, when 
attention is given to the United States, it generally revolves around the Great Depression.  Works 
that do study the United States and its relationship with Nazi Germany seem to be primarily 
focused on specific factions or people in the country. Therefore, this investigation will be an 
attempt to fill this gap with a comprehensive study that discusses the various views the country 
had on the Third Reich before entering World War II. 
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  The United States merits this in-depth look because of the role that it had on a global 
scale in the 1930s. Just over a decade earlier, the world emerged from the First World War.  
Even though it was not fully aware of it, the United States was on the path to becoming a world 
power; it had already proven its strength when it turned the tide of the war by deciding to fight 
alongside Britain and France and helping them win the war.  Also, although it chose to remove 
itself from peace talks with Nazi Germany, the United States was certainly well respected and 
deemed powerful by the world’s leaders.  The memoirs of Cordell Hull support this view, 
illustrating the number of times Britain and France looked to the United States for advice, 
support, and influence in dealing with Hitler.  The United States certainly had significant sway in 
world affairs and could have chosen to use it to influence Germany and European affairs more 
than it actually did. 
In addition, this analysis could help shed further light on a debate in the country that 
continues to the present day: what role should the United States have when it comes to world 
affairs?  It is easy to look back at the past and, in hindsight, deem a decision right or wrong.  This 
is certainly the case for World War II: almost everyone looking back would agree that it was 
right for the United States to enter the war and support the Allies.  The result was the defeat of 
the brutal Nazi regime and the rest of the Axis powers, the end of the Holocaust, and the 
liberation of the survivors of the war and the genocide.  Even so, it did not act soon enough to 
prevent all of the death and destruction that the entire Nazi affair caused.  The United States has 
continually faced crises similar to these.  The most recent in memory include the genocides in 
Darfur and Bosnia and the threat of nuclear weapons in Iran and North Korea, to name a few.  
From a humanitarian perspective, it is easy to justify intervening in other countries to stop or 
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prevent crimes against humanity.  However, in reality, there are many factors that influence a 
country’s decision on whether or not to act.  A look at these factors in the United States before 
World War II when dealing with Nazi Germany could therefore prove beneficial to this ongoing 
debate. 
The investigation into this topic has sought to answer two primary questions. One is how 
much did the United States know about Hitler, Nazism, and what was occurring in Nazi 
Germany before U.S. entry into World War II.  Was there enough information available to 
Americans that could have convinced them to intervene?  And two, how did the country respond 
to what it did know about the Nazi situation?  Was there a consensus in opinions or was the 
country divided in its views?  To organize the answers to these questions, the thesis will be 
divided into three chapters.   
The first chapter will focus on the U.S. government and its role in the debate.  This 
chapter will focus primarily on the president, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and the secretary of 
state, Cordell Hull, because of their top positions in the country’s foreign affairs and foreign 
policies.  It will also discuss other key players in the government, such as the ambassador to 
Germany and several congressmen. 
The second chapter will discuss the section of the country that either outwardly supported 
the Nazis or sympathized with them.  This chapter will discuss prominent figures in this 
movement such as Henry Ford, Charles Lindbergh, and Father Coughlin. 
Finally, the third chapter will deal with the American public.  Specifically, it will look at 
the part of the country that was against Nazism.  This section will utilize a combination of 
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newspaper and magazine articles and Gallup Poll results to come to a conclusion regarding 
American public opinion on Nazi Germany. 
Ultimately, this investigation will address the following question: Why did the United 
States not intervene in European affairs and allow Nazi Germany to initiate and continue its 












To understand why the United States did not get more involved in European affairs in 
reaction to the rise of Nazi Germany, it is essential to focus on the role of the U.S. government in 
international diplomacy.  The speeches, writing, and decisions of President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull, and the actions of some of the more prominent 
members of Congress may offer some insight into American foreign policy during the 1930s. 
When dealing in foreign policy, the president has the most power and influence.  In 1932, 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt became the 32nd president of the United States of America and was 
re-elected three more times.  Despite his importance in terms of his role in international affairs at 
the end of the 1930s, he was elected based primarily on his domestic ideology; only in later years 
did his attention turn to the global theater.1  Unfortunately for historians, Roosevelt did not write 
an autobiography or a memoir before he died in 1945 at the start of his 4th presidential term.2 
Therefore, it is necessary to look at his speeches, his writings, and what others who knew him 
said about him in order to try to better understand him and his decisions.   
According to Steven Casey in his book, Cautious Crusade, Roosevelt was aware of Hitler 
and the Nazi Party in Germany from the very beginning of his presidency.  He knew enough 
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about Hitler and the Nazis to be concerned about their rise to power considering the stark 
contrast between their values and ideas and his.  Roosevelt was staunchly democratic; he 
supported free trade; and he wanted to improve living conditions for the general public. Hitler, 
on the other hand, was pushing to establish a one-party system with himself at its head; he 
wanted to separate the Third Reich from the international economic system; and he sought to 
persecute the Jews and other groups.3 FDR recognized, however, that when they first rose to 
power, Hitler and the Nazis posed little threat to the world outside Germany because he 
considered the country broken and weak.4  Further, Roosevelt refused to believe that the Nazi 
regime would gain enough power to become a real threat because, as he wrote to a friend, he still 
believed that “in every country the people themselves are more peaceably and liberally inclined 
than their governments.”5  According to Casey, Roosevelt’s naïve optimism helped create a state 
of inaction.   
Reports from Ambassador William E. Dodd in Berlin stating that over half of the 
population opposed its government confirmed the president’s belief in the German people.  Also, 
the vast amount of spending on the military convinced FDR that the German economy would 
soon plummet and result in bankruptcy; this would greatly weaken the Nazi government’s 
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strength.  The combination of these two factors, he believed, would end Nazi rule quickly and 
without intervention from outside parties.6 
In 1933, Roosevelt was given a copy of Mein Kampf, Hitler’s quasi-autobiographical 
book that delineated the ideals of Nazism and his goals for Germany.  The copy, translated into 
English and abridged by E.T.S. Dugdale, was heavily criticized for omitting several sections 
discussing anti-Semitism.  Roosevelt, to his credit, wrote on the book’s flyleaf, “This translation 
is so expurgated as to give a wholly false view of what Hitler really is or says – The German 
original would make a different story.”7  This demonstrates that, early in his presidency, FDR 
was aware of the dangers that Adolf Hitler and the Nazis could pose if they were to gain enough 
strength.  However, he was optimistic in his view that they would weaken and hoped “that the 
type of government [in Germany] . . . is being severely tested from the inside, . . . and that there 
may be a break in the log jam.”8  
During the second half of the 1930s, Roosevelt continued his decision to not intervene in 
Europe due, increasingly, to the isolationist sentiment prominent in the United States at the time.  
In 1935, Italy invaded Ethiopia and successfully conquered it within a year.9  In response to that 
conflict, Congress passed the first Neutrality Act.  This legislation sought to keep the United 
States out of war by forcing the president to establish an embargo on the selling of arms to 
nations at war.   Although FDR would have preferred to adapt it to give him more leeway to 
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decide if, when, and against whom he could levy an embargo, he decided to allow it to pass 
without any changes in order to avoid conflict domestically and internationally.10  Even though it 
would probably have been over-ridden by Congress had he vetoed it, The Neutrality Act was 
another missed opportunity for him to, at the very least, demonstrate his desire to support 
England and France with military supplies in case of war against Germany.  During the same 
year, Germany announced its rearmament plans and invaded the Rhineland.  Both of these 
actions violated the Treaty of Versailles.  Roosevelt again chose to remain silent on the issue.11  
In 1936, the Olympic Games were set to be held in Germany for both the winter and 
summer games.  In the months leading up to the games, more and more controversy developed 
over whether the United States should send a team to Germany or whether it should boycott the 
Olympics.  Many people, including Ambassador Dodd, reported back to the government that 
Germany had been discriminating against Jews and would therefore not allow any to participate 
on their team; if challenged, they might allow a few to participate but only as a façade to mask 
the truth about the anti-Semitic conditions in Germany.12  This clearly went against the policies 
of the International Olympic Committee: “The Olympic protocol provides that there shall be no 
restriction of competition because of class, color, or creed.”13 
According to David Clay Large, Roosevelt had doubts about sending the U.S. team to 
Berlin and sympathized with the struggles of the Jews in Germany at the time.  He decided, 
however, to put his personal opinions aside and did not weigh in on the matter.  To support the 
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boycott movement would have gotten flak from right-wing opponents, who already considered 
him to be too friendly to Jews, and from the U.S. Olympic Committee, who had already sent a 
delegation to Germany and had been promised that there would not be any discrimination.  On 
the other hand, to come out and support the pro-participation movement would have also created 
controversy and would have gone against his personal views.  Partly due to his failure to take a 
stand against Nazi Germany and Hitler when the opportunity to do so arose, the Olympics 
continued as planned and were an overall success.14  More significant, though, was FDR’s 
missed opportunity to undermine the Nazi government and openly denounce it; an American 
boycott of the games would have potentially resulted in many other countries suit and quite 
possibly could have weakened Nazi popularity in Germany.15 
In 1936, Roosevelt hinted at the possibility of intervention in the form of a general 
warning.  In a speech given about a month after the beginning of the Spanish Civil War, he said 
of the United States: “We are not isolationists except in so far as we seek to isolate ourselves 
completely from war.  Yet we must remember that so long as war exists on earth there will be 
some danger that even the nation which most ardently desires peace may be drawn into war.”16 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull wrote later that he and the president were both in 
complete agreement over their policy of nonintervention in Spain.17  Their opinions on the matter 
did not change at all throughout the entire war.  This was despite the fact that they knew that 
Germany and Italy, going against agreements to not get involved, were sending strong help to the 
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right-wing group under Francisco Franco, and the fact that FDR and Hull both privately 
sympathized with the opposing Royalists who supported the monarchy. 
Ultimately, as the evidence clearly proves, Franklin D. Roosevelt was a president who 
battled with the idea of isolationism throughout his first two terms.  While he recognized the 
danger posed by the Nazi government in Germany, his optimism in regard to their strength and 
longevity and the isolationist mindset prevented him from taking action.  As 1939 approached, 
Roosevelt would do his best to intervene indirectly when he could against Nazi Germany and the 
Axis powers.  
After the president, the secretary of state had the most power to deal with foreign issues.  
From 1933 until 1944, Cordell Hull assumed this role under the condition that he would “aid the 
President in every possible way in the formulation and conduct of foreign policy,” as opposed to 
simply overseeing communication with foreign governments.18 Unlike Roosevelt, Hull outlived 
World War II and published his memoirs in 1948.  These memoirs give a first-person perspective 
of many events and controversies that occurred during his time in office.  When focusing on 
issues related to Nazi Germany, the memoirs paint a picture of a man who was staunchly 
isolationist even though he was opposed to the Nazi Party. 
Very early on in his memoirs, Hull mentions the Nazi Party and the rise of Adolf Hitler to 
power in Germany: 
I had long been studying the purposes and effects of Nazism.  In speeches back in 1930 
and 1931 I had called attention to the growth of dictator movements abroad and the 
danger they offered to a peaceful world.  There was little doubt in my mind in March, 
1933, that Germany would provide one of my biggest problems in the years to come.19 
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This statement epitomized his personal opinions on the issue.  While it may have been 
exaggerated to some degree due to hindsight, his documented conversations and actions affirm 
its overall veracity.   
 As early as March of 1933, Hull began confronting German officials regarding Nazi 
policies.  Behind closed doors, he met with the German ambassador to the United States, Hans 
Luther, to discuss violence and abuse of American citizens in Germany and Nazi persecution of 
Jews.  He urged Luther to persuade the German government to return the country to normalcy 
without Nazi brutality.  In addition, he suggested that if things did not improve, he would make 
an official complaint to the Nazi regime, though this proved to be an unfounded threat.20 
Some days later, Hull responded to Germany’s announcement that it would no longer pay 
debts to other countries including the United States.  Hull confronted the head of the German 
Reichsbank, Dr. Schacht, once again behind closed doors; this, however, was also 
unsuccessful.21  
As the year progressed, more and more U.S. companies began boycotting German goods 
to protest the treatment of Jews in Germany at the time.   Both Ambassador Luther and the 
German Chargé d’Affaires, Rudolf Leitner, visited Hull to protest the boycott.  Hull warned 
about possible legislation against Germany and more boycotts if the Jewish persecution problem 
were not solved.22  While Hull’s actions towards Nazi Germany during this time were very 
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subtle, they were also proof of his opposition to the changes occurring in Germany at the hands 
of the Nazis.   
 Cordell Hull’s aversion to Nazi policy, however, did little, if anything at all, to influence 
his foreign policy decisions.  Isolationism dominated almost all of his decisions.  When, in 1934, 
government official Hugh Johnson spoke out against a series of executions in Germany of Adolf 
Hitler’s political opponents, Hull expressed fear of Johnson’s views being attributed to an 
official position taken by the U.S. government.  As such, he issued a statement clarifying the 
situation to avoid direct conflict with Germany.23 
When it became apparent that Japan and Germany were about to join forces as allies that 
same year, Hull gave a speech hinting at those dangerous developments that could threaten peace 
in the world.  Even then he did not specify to whom or what exactly he was referring in those 
comments.24  The following year, the ex-Chief Consul in Berlin, George Messersmith, sent a 
letter to the Secretary of State urging the government to speak out on the issue of the 1936 Berlin 
Olympics.   He stressed the importance of taking a stand against participation since a boycott of 
the games by the United States would be significant in undermining the international and 
German perception of Hitler and the Nazi government.  Once again, Hull missed an opportunity 
to undermine Nazi policy and instead chose to remain neutral.25 
 Over and over again, Secretary of State Cordell Hull avoided any action that would 
directly contest or reprimand Nazi Germany for their increasing bellicosity and aggression.  
More than anything else, he maintained neutrality until 1938 because of his own isolationist 
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mentality and the isolationism rampant in the United States.  Even though his personal opinions 
on taking action seemingly changed in the mid-1930s, the isolationist support in the United 
States prevented him from acting in any other manner.26  In a speech he gave to a graduating 
class at Brown University in 1936, Hull very clearly stated that war in almost any circumstance 
was unacceptable.  In stark contrast to previous sentiments, though, he “appealed for public 
opinion to take an interest in these developments [of national aggrandizement, warring, and 
violations of international agreements] in an effort to turn their dangerous trend.”27  In reference 
to the decision to remain neutral during the Spanish Civil War, knowing that both Germany and 
Italy were aiding the revolutionaries under fascist Francisco Franco, Hull wrote that the 
government’s neutrality policy did not reflect their views on who was right and who was 
wrong.28  This view also applied to all other foreign policy in this time period. 
 Aside from President Franklin Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull, there were 
several other government officials who had influence in American foreign policy and, contrary to 
Roosevelt and Hull, wanted the American government to take a stand against Nazi Germany.  
Two of particular significance were George S. Messersmith and William E. Dodd.  George S. 
Messersmith was the consul general from 1930 to 1934 and also served as the U.S. ambassador 
to Austria for three years afterward.29  William E. Dodd was the U.S. ambassador to Germany 
                                                
26. Hull, Memoirs, 397. 
 
27. Ibid., 483. 
 
28. Ibid., 483. 
 
29. Jesse Stiller, George S. Messersmith: Diplomat of Democracy (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 1987), 26-95. 
 16 
during the years 1933 and 1937.30  Both men played a major role in informing the president and 
the secretary of state of the increasingly troublesome situation in Germany and were able to 
provide first-hand accounts of what they experienced and witnessed. 
 Ambassador Dodd and Consul General Messersmith were both steadfast in their 
disapproval and fear of the Nazi government.  Their reports on the internal turmoil in Germany 
provided leading government officials with detailed information on the growing threat in Europe.  
In 1933, Messersmith warned the newcomers to the State Department that they must take caution 
when dealing with Nazi Germany.  He went on to say that Germany was not a country interested 
in peace and that many of the leading government officials were “psychopathic cases [who] 
would ordinarily be receiving treatment somewhere.”31  In March of 1935, Dodd reported to 
Cordell Hull his discovery of a series of secret meetings between Japan and Germany that would 
ultimately result in rearmament and the formation of an alliance between the two countries.32  
Later that year, in a message to Hull, Messersmith warned against U.S. participation in the 1936 
Olympic games in Berlin and reiterated that there was increasing discrimination and oppression 
of “Jews, dissident Catholics, Protestants, professors, artists, and intellectuals”; Dodd’s own 
report to Hull confirmed Messersmith’s account.33 These are just some of the many examples 
that shed light on their opinions of the Third Reich and also help to answer the question of what 
was known about Nazi Germany. 
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 Finally, most other government officials had little influence in foreign policy decisions 
related to Germany.  According to Steven Casey, there were several outspoken members of the 
Roosevelt administration who opposed Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party in Germany, including 
Harold L. Ickes and Henry Morgenthau, Jr., the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of the 
Treasury, respectively.34  Several congressmen also spoke out on the Nazi issue.  Although 
individually they had about as much sway as the previously mentioned cabinet members, some 
were able to unite and helped keep the United States on its isolationist path.  Of note were 
Senator Gerald Nye and Senator Pittman, who were both isolationists.  The two men served on 
the Nye Committee, a Senate investigation committee with the purpose of discovering who or 
what was actually responsible for the United States entering World War I.  The results of these 
investigations found that American bankers and businessmen were responsible; the committee 
thus undermined internationalist views and played a role in the continued support of isolationist 
policy in the late 1930s.35 
In sum, the United States government chose to maintain almost complete neutrality when 
dealing with Nazi Germany up until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941.   Opinions did 
not vary much in terms of how Adolf Hitler and his regime were viewed; most government 
officials recognized Nazi Germany as a potential threat to the United States and opposed the 
increasing Nazi brutality against Jews, political opponents, neighboring countries, and others.  
They disagreed, however, when it came to the role of the United States in international politics.  
President Roosevelt began his presidency as an isolationist who underestimated the major role 
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that Nazi Germany would have in global affairs.  He then changed positions as he learned 
progressively more about the emerging conflicts in Europe.  Secretary of State Hull followed a 
similar path, though with less enthusiasm for intervention than Roosevelt in the final years of the 
1930s.  Even though the government had access to information about the situation in Germany, 
primarily from the U.S. embassy and consulate in Germany and from other governments, it still 
remained neutral.  Above all else, the reasons for the American neutrality before World War II 
was the support of isolationism that was prevalent in the United States and naïveté when it came 













Although they were a small portion of the United States population, during the 1920s and 
30s there were several Nazi-sympathizing factions that emerged within the country.  While their 
opinions were not representative of the general sentiment at the time, several were able to voice 
their opinions to the public and contribute to the national debate over how best to deal with the 
problems arising in Europe. 
 Three of the most influential voices of this group were Henry Ford, Father Charles 
Coughlin, and Charles A. Lindbergh.  Each of them expressed, to varying degrees, their approval 
of the Nazi government in Germany or of anti-Semitism, a core principle of Nazism.  Through 
the use of newspapers, speeches, and other means, they were able to reach a relatively large 
audience in America. 
 Before taking a closer look at the Nazi-leaning sentiment at the time, it is important to 
recognize the existence of anti-Semitism in the United States long before the rise of the Third 
Reich.  According to Leonard Dinnerstein, this negative attitude toward members of the Jewish 
community is the result of the strong Christian influence on American society and thus existed 
even during colonial times.1  One additional factor that may have played a part in the rise of anti-
Semitism during the late 1800s and the early 1900s is the rise of Jewish immigration into the 
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country.  For comparison, the total number of documented immigrants who arrived in the United 
States prior to 1890 was 15,436,042; about 2% (roughly 300,000) were Jewish.  From 1890 until 
1914, however, there was a heavy influx of Jews from Europe, totaling almost 1,700,000.2   
Animosity toward the Jewish community was also taught in school, as evinced in the use 
of McGuffey’s Eclectic Readers.  These were a set of educational books published from 1836 
until, primarily, the end of the 19th century that utilized a combination of essays, poems, and 
narratives to teach children about the world around them and establish a set of morals by which 
to live.  The books were so popular and widespread that, during their peak, they were the second 
most widely read books in the United States (the King James Bible being the first).3  In one 
edition of the Fifth Eclectic Reader, students read and discussed Shakespeare’s The Merchant of 
Venice, a play about a stereotypically depicted Jewish character named Shylock, who gives a 
loan to a Christian character.  When he is unable to repay his debt on time, Shylock is offered a 
choice between a larger sum of money and a pound of the Christian’s flesh.  He selects the 
pound of flesh but is prevented from collecting it and is ultimately forced to convert to 
Christianity.  The McGuffey Reader followed the play with several reading comprehension and 
analysis questions, including, “Why did Shylock choose the pound of flesh rather than the 
payment of his debts?” and “How is Shylock punished? Was his punishment just?”4  Also, the 
Third and Fourth Eclectic Readers taught about the Jewish inability to follow the morals 
established in the Old Testament and that the Jews failed to recognize the predictions about the 
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rise of Jesus Christ and the spread of Christianity that could be found within the Old Testament.5  
Thus, American children were taught early on about the stereotypical Jewish figure as being 
inferior to Christians and being shrewd, greedy, and inhuman.   
In another instance of the Jewish stereotype being promulgated in textbooks, the entry for 
“Jews” in the New International Encyclopædia, published in 1902, depicted members of the 
Jewish community in a similar fashion: 
Among the distinguishing mental and moral traits of the Jews may be mentioned: a strong 
distaste for hard or violent physical labor; a strong family sense and philoprogenitiveness 
[the trait of having many offspring]; a marked religious instinct; . . . remarkable power to 
survive in adverse environments, combined with great ability to retain racial solidarity; 
capacity for exploitation, both individual and social; shrewdness and astuteness in 
speculation and money matters generally; an Oriental love of display and a full 
appreciation of the power and pleasure of social position; a very high average of 
intellectual ability.6 
 
Just like McGuffey’s Readers, the Shylock stereotype was passed off as a factual description of 
Jews. 
 Many examples of the effects of this indoctrination appeared in the early 20th century.  In 
one instance, a woman from Chicago married a Jewish man and was forced to move several 
times due to the severe persecution they experienced, ranging from the loss of friends to acts of 
vandalism by neighborhood children.7    In 1911, a group of Irish men and teenagers attacked 
Jews in Malden, Massachusetts using “iron bars, wagon spokes, stones, jagged bottles, and 
sticks” and chanting “Beat the Jews” and “Kill the Jews”.  In response to the assault, only a few 
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were arrested, the police captain praised them for being “fine citizens,” and in court, even though 
the judge was convinced they were guilty, only four of the sixteen attackers were convicted.8  
 It was in this environment that Henry Ford grew up.  Ford was born in 1863 in 
southeastern Michigan into a family of farmers.  They were Protestant and of Irish descent.  At 
the age of seventeen, Ford left his family’s farm to begin what would become his lifelong career 
working with automobiles and factory machinery in Detroit.9  He would ultimately go on to 
found the Ford Motor Company, use the assembly line to mass-produce affordable Model-T cars, 
and revolutionize the auto-industry.10 
 Less widely known than his work with automobiles was Ford’s anti-Semitism.  His 
antipathy toward Jews stemmed, at least in part, from McGuffey.  Ford, like many other children 
at the time, had grown up learning from McGuffey’s Eclectic Readers.  McGuffey was his 
favorite author even as an adult: he could recite passages from the books perfectly.  In 1934, 
Ford had McGuffey’s entire estate in Pennsylvania moved to his museum in Michigan.  Two 
years later, Ford served on a panel that was in charge of organizing and publishing Old Favorites 
from McGuffey Readers.  Out of the many Shakespeare passages that had been included in the 
Readers, only three were selected: one of them was The Merchant of Venice.  How much 
influence Ford had when selecting this piece for the collection is unknown; however, it is likely 
that he did have great influence in the entire selection process considering his role as associate 
editor and the book’s dedication to him.  In 1914, when the Anti-Defamation League petitioned 
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and lobbied to remove The Merchant of Venice from the classroom because it “serves to increase 
misunderstanding of Jews by non-Jews . . . because Shylock . . . has become an unhappy symbol 
of Jewish vindictiveness, malice and hatred,” Ford rejected the action as a personal offense to 
McGuffey.11 
It was not until 1920, however, that Ford tried to spread his anti-Semitic ideas to the 
public.  Throughout the year, he published a series of articles in the Ford newspaper, The 
Dearborn Independent.  These articles collectively came to be known as The International Jew.12  
The Dearborn Independent was established by Henry Ford years earlier in order to spread his 
ideas on politics and life and to shape public opinion in a way he saw fit.13  The newspaper’s 
tirades against Jews began the year after it was first published.  Some have suggested that after 
the initial year’s failure, Ford began writing about the Jews because of a recommendation that he 
add sensationalism to the stories in Dearborn.  However, according to Albert Lee, a writer for 
Ford Motor Company publications and author of Henry Ford and the Jews, it is certain that Ford 
was set on publishing his anti-Semitic ideas from the start; when new employees of the 
newspaper were hired, they were told “Ford’s going to start in on the Jews.”14 
By and large, The International Jew was based on the Protocols of the Learned Elders of 
Zion.15  This was a document that was published in Russia first in 1903, then again in 1917 at the 
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time of the Bolshevik Revolution.  Protocols was an alleged document that claimed there was a 
Jewish conspiracy to take over the world and force non-Jews into submission.16   This was, of 
course, disproven, but it was reported and republished several times, including in The Dearborn 
Independent.17  The International Jew also expanded on the supposed Jewish problem.  In the 
article “Germany’s Reaction Against the Jew,” it described the relationship between the German 
and the Jew as one of host and guest, respectively; although this was to be expected, Jews 
wanted to be in power, and thus worked together to overthrow the German Empire in World War 
I.  It placed responsibility for the Bolshevik Revolution on Russian Jews and gave the Bolshevik 
government the title, “dictatorship of Jews.”18  In addition, it described the supposed Jewish 
problem, claiming that Jews feel superior to Gentiles (non-Jews) and that they consider Gentiles 
their enemies.19  Through The International Jew, Ford was able to express his anti-Semitism to 
the general public and spread his ideas. 
During the 1930s, Henry Ford became much less public about his anti-Jewish sentiments.  
This was the result of the stigma surrounding a lawsuit against Ford, in which he was sued for 
libel against a Jewish farmer.  He rejected this claim and subsequently apologized for The 
International Jew.20  Although Ford distanced himself from the publication, he continued to be 
recognized for it.  The Nazis, in particular, held Ford in high regard for his efforts in spreading 
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his anti-Semitic ideas to the American public.  In 1931, a Detroit News reporter asked Adolf 
Hitler about a portrait of Henry Ford that hung behind his desk.  Hitler responded that it was 
because Ford was his inspiration.21   
In 1933, The International Jew was republished in Germany as Der Internationale Jude 
with Henry Ford given high praise for being the first person to expose the “Jewish Question” in 
America.  When confronted about the publication, he expressed his recognition of its danger but 
refused to restate his rejection of The International Jew.22  In 1938, he was awarded the 
Verdienstkreuz Deutscher Adler (the Grand Service Cross of the Supreme Order of the German 
Eagle) by the Nazis for his work with the automobile.  Although the award was not (ostensibly) 
in recognition of his anti-Semitic publications, Ford received much criticism within the United 
States for it, especially after it became apparent that he would not return or decline it.23 Finally, 
in 1940, in a survey conducted by one of Ford’s advertising agencies, it was found that 80% of 
all men questioned had heard that Ford was anti-Semitic.24  Ultimately, as demonstrated by the 
1940 survey, Ford was successful at publicizing his anti-Semitic beliefs within the United States 
and aligning himself in this regard with the Nazis. 
Father Coughlin, like Ford, was anti-Semitic, but he had access to an even larger 
audience.  Charles E. Coughlin was born in 1891 in Canada.  His family was devoutly Catholic 
and they were of Irish descent.  In 1916 he was ordained a Catholic priest.  During the 1920s, he 
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immigrated to the United States where he would gain fame and notoriety for his public speeches 
and religious sermons, particularly over the radio.25  His radio program began in 1927, just one 
year after the first network radio station, NBC, had been established.  The program was titled the 
“Golden Hour of the Shrine of the Little Flower,” and he soon began calling his audience “The 
Radio League of the Little Flower.”26 
In spite of Coughlin’s attempts to justify his comments and ideas, he was rather explicitly 
anti-Semitic.  In speeches he gave in the early 1930s, he criticized and attacked the Jewish 
community for their supposed exploitation of the working class and for allegedly causing the 
global economic problems.  During these sermons, he used the terms Shylock and Rothschilds as 
synonyms for his true targets: Shylock being the name of the Jewish character previously 
discussed and Rothschild being the name of a wealthy family of Jewish bankers in Europe.27  
During the mid-1930s, after having supported President Roosevelt for several years, Coughlin 
turned on him for acting in a manner that he believed would lead the United States into the 
European conflict.  He later attributed his change of heart to Roosevelt’s determination to defeat 
Hitler and save the Jews; Coughlin also claimed Roosevelt, himself, was a Jew.28  Around the 
same time as their falling out, Coughlin gave a speech in which he told his audience, “while we 
love each other, we’re so open-minded [to] Jews [and] Mohammedans . . . remember this is a 
Christian nation! Let’s not overwork this democracy.”  Soon thereafter, he criticized the Jewish 
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belief system and challenged Jews to accept the Christian belief of loving “thy neighbor as 
thyself.”29  Coughlin was also aware of Ford’s work with The International Jew and the 
Protocols of the Elders of Zion. He published his own version of the documents in the summer of 
1938.  In a similar fashion to Ford, he blamed Jews and other factions within the United States 
for trying to drag the country into war due to a selfish concern for the Jews in Europe.30  Finally, 
as Europe was on the brink of entering World War II, Coughlin blamed anti-Semitism on the 
Jews because of their silence in the face of communism, and he demanded that refugee Jews 
from Europe be denied entry into the United States because of their role in the spread of 
communism.31  These were just some of the examples of his anti-Semitism. 
In addition, Father Coughlin exhibited many signs of actual sympathy with the Nazis and 
was perceived in this way by many within the general public.  First and foremost, after 
comparing speeches given by both Coughlin and Adolf Hitler, it becomes apparent that, aside 
from the language difference, their oratory is similar. Both spoke in a very passionate way with 
an aggressive tone, and both used expressive mannerisms to rally their audiences.  Further, their 
ideas and speeches were, in many ways, similar in regard to their anti-Semitism and their support 
of fascism.  The striking similarities between the two were obvious even to contemporary 
listeners, as demonstrated by a letter Coughlin received that described the two of them as “alike 
as peas in a pod,” and by one of his other followers, who stated that “when he spoke it was a 
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thrill like Hitler.  And the magnetism was uncanny.”32  As with Ford, Coughlin was also heavily 
praised in Nazi Germany for exposing the truth about the Jews.33 In 1939, when Hitler broke an 
agreement regarding the annexing of a portion of Czechoslovakia, Coughlin defended him.  He 
blamed the signatories of the Treaty of Versailles for eliminating the German Empire and 
causing nearly insurmountable economic problems for the country.  He concluded that Hitlerism 
would not be stopped.34  Also, it was discovered in the late 1930s that Father Coughlin had 
published an article in 1938 that was an almost exact copy of a speech given by Joseph 
Goebbels, the Nazi Minister of Propaganda, three years earlier: 
Goebbels’ speech: “On the 26th of December, 1918, one of the Socialist members of the 
Reichstag, the Jew, Dr. Ozkar Cohn, declared that on the 5th of the previous month, he 
had received 4,000,000 rubles from Joffe for the purpose of the German revolution.” 
 
Coughlin’s article: “On December 26, 1918, one of the Socialist members of the 
Reichstag, the eminent Jew, Dr. Oskar Cohn, declared that on the 5th of the previous 
month he had received 4,000,000 rubles from Joffe for the purpose of instigating a 
revolution in Germany.”35 
 
As this sample shows, the two texts are virtually indistinguishable.  This demonstrates that 
Coughlin paid attention to the Nazi government and sympathized with (at the very least) its anti-
Semitic ideology enough to plagiarize this anti-Jewish speech.  
 Father Coughlin played a small, but significant, role in the national debate over Nazism 
due to the size of his audience.  According to a Gallup poll conducted in 1938, over six million 
families with radios listened to his broadcasts.  In a follow up question, these families were asked 
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their opinion of what was said on the programs: 83% approved.36  In another public opinion poll, 
it was estimated that he had a regular audience of three million people every Sunday and up to 
fifteen million in 1939.37 Due mainly to his opposition to FDR and his access to a large audience, 
the Roosevelt administration successfully pressured the Catholic Church in the Vatican City to 
take action again Coughlin.  As a result, he was silenced by the Vatican in 1942.38 
 Finally, the other leading figure who showed signs of Nazi sympathy was Charles 
Augustus Lindbergh.  He was born in 1902 in Detroit, Michigan.  He was of Swedish origin on 
his father’s side and a mixture of English, Irish, and Scottish ancestry on his mother’s side.39  His 
rise to fame came from being the first pilot to ever fly non-stop across the Atlantic Ocean 
between New York City and Paris, which he accomplished in 1927.  Tragically, he was also 
widely known because of the “Crime of the Century”, when his son was kidnapped and was 
never found alive.40 
 Consequently, Lindbergh and his wife moved to Europe to seclude themselves from the 
public.  It was during this phase of his life that he began his association with Nazi Germany.  In 
1936, the Military Attaché to the American Embassy in Berlin, Major Truman Smith approached 
Charles Lindbergh out of fear of the new air force that Nazi Germany was developing, called the 
Luftwaffe. On account of Lindbergh’s experience with aviation, he was asked to inspect German 
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air factories and to secretly report back intelligence to the U.S. military.  As a result, he traveled 
to Germany several times during the late 1930s.41 
 His first trip to Germany took place in 1936.  While there, he was escorted through 
several German factories, met with the leader of the Luftwaffe, General Hermann Goering, and 
attended the 1936 Berlin Olympics.  While many praised him for helping improve American-
German relations, some feared that the Nazi leaders would interpret his visit as an approval of 
their government.   In addition, when reporting his impressions of Germany to Major Smith, he 
praised Hitler, writing that “the condition of the country, and the appearance of the average 
person whom I saw, leaves with me the impression that Hitler must have far more character and 
vision that I thought [he would based on] the accounts in America and England.”42   
His second trip in 1937 only improved his view of Germany and Hitler.  In his report to 
Smith, he estimated that based on the contemporary trends in air power development in the 
United States and Germany, they would be equally matched by 1941. The report was widely 
distributed in the United States.43  The following year, Lindbergh wrote a letter stating that 
Germany should be allowed to expand further into the east instead of risking entering England 
and France into a war for which they were unprepared.  This letter was ultimately sent to U.S. 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull. Lindbergh also believed that Germany was essential to impeding 
the oncoming threat of the Soviet Union.44  
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In 1938, like Henry Ford, Lindbergh was awarded the Verdienstkreuz Deutscher Adler 
for his aviation services.  As with Ford, there was much outcry over his acceptance of the award 
and his refusal to return or decline it, especially after Kristallnacht, one of the worst pogroms of 
Jews that Nazi Germany had seen.  He would never understand the controversy behind his 
decision to keep the award; returning the award, which was given during a time of peace, would 
have been “an unnecessary insult,” in his view.45 
 Although Charles Lindbergh was infatuated with Nazi Germany because of his interest in 
the Luftwaffe and the progress Germany had made technologically under the Nazis, his views on 
the problems Jews were facing in the country were less obvious.  In a journal entry from 1938, 
he responded to a news report of increasing Jewish problems by questioning the reasoning 
behind the German aggression towards Jews.  He wondered why they were so “unreasonable” in 
how they were treating the Jews but recognized that Germany did have a severe Jewish problem. 
46   
In April of 1939, he indirectly defended Germany’s actions by claiming that every 
country had been breaking agreements and promises; the only difference was that she was doing 
so faster than the others.47 Later that month, he wrote that he believed “a few Jews add strength 
and character to a country, but too many create chaos.”  Also, in 1940, after having struck up a 
friendship with Henry Ford more than ten years earlier, Ford revealed to a former FBI agent that 
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whenever the two of them got together, they would talk about nothing else but “the Jews.”48 
Most likely, Charles Lindbergh did hold some anti-Semitic beliefs; however, he was certainly 
put off by the harsh persecution that was occurring in Germany and instead focused his attention 
on German air power and the Nazi government. 
 In short, during the 1930s, there was a small percentage in the United States that was 
sympathetic to Nazi ideology and the Nazi government.  Among those who fell into this category 
were: the German-American Bund (also known as the Friends of the New Germany), which was 
a Nazi organization that attempted to spread Nazism within America;49 William Dudley Pelley’s 
Silver Shirts/Christian Party; and Reverend Gerald Burton Winrod’s Defenders of the Christian 
Faith.50  However, the three people who had the most influential voices in favor of Nazi 
Germany or anti-Semitism were Henry Ford, Father Charles Coughlin, and Charles Lindbergh.  
The former two were anti-Semites who regularly voiced their opinions through the use of 
periodicals, speeches, and radio broadcasts, while the latter was infatuated with Nazi Germany 
and had direct communication with the United States Army.  Therefore, they had a small but 
significant collective impact on the national reaction to the rise of Nazi Germany. 
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In stark contrast to the anti-Semitic or Nazi-leaning ideas of the few vocal figures 
discussed in the previous chapter, the opinions of the majority in the United States regarding 
Nazi Germany were less apparent and varied slightly based on a multitude of factors.  
Regardless, a general sense of the opinions of most of the American public can be derived 
through an analysis of newspaper and magazine articles and Gallup poll results from the 1930s. 
 First and foremost, The New York Times was arguably the most influential and widely 
read newspaper in the United States during this time.  It was awarded a Pulitzer Prize in 1941 for 
its foreign news reports.  In 1943, Time magazine emphasized its importance, writing, “What 
Harvard is to U.S. education, what the House of Morgan has been to U.S. finance, The New York 
Times is to U.S. journalism.”  Secretary of State Cordell Hull praised the newspaper for its 
“magnificent public service” in informing the American public, particularly concerning foreign 
affairs.  It had a readership of about 440,000 on weekdays and 805,000 on Sundays.  In addition, 
it sent its articles to 525 newspapers around the country, including the Chicago Tribune and the 
Los Angeles Times.  A poll in 1939 found that 100% of the 200 journalists surveyed read the 
Times.1  Because of its significance, The New York Times serves as an indicator of how much 
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information regarding the problems in Germany was available to the American public and offers 
a sense of the sentiment of the time. 
 The Times frequently wrote on the occurrences and events from within Germany; and 
with a staff of 30 foreign correspondents in Europe, it was able to do so in a timely and accurate 
manner.2  However, Laurel Leff, professor of journalism at Northeastern University and ex-
journalist for the Wall Street Journal, criticized the newspaper for its treatment of the Jewish 
persecution in Germany.  According to her, the Times publisher, Arthur Hays Sulzberger, 
actively worked to downplay the problems Jews were facing during the 1930s and even through 
World War II.  This was due to his Jewish background.  Concerned that the anti-Jewish 
community would dismiss The New York Times as a Jewish newspaper, he set out to establish 
complete objectivity and neutrality when working on Jewish related articles.  According to Leff, 
Sulzberger was, in part, responsible for the lack of complete awareness in the United States 
regarding the problems facing the Jews.  He was staunchly opposed to the persecutions but 
stressed that the victims should not be viewed as primarily composed of Jews but instead as a 
variety of minorities.3  Not only did Sulzberger alter the wording used in his articles; he also 
suppressed any editorials that addressed the rise of Nazism.  He even went so far as to pressure a 
new Jewish journalist on the Times to reject an award he was set to receive for his work exposing 
the Jewish problems in Germany.4 
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 Regardless, The New York Times printed many articles on the rise of the Nazis; and even 
if they were not wholly familiar with the plight of Jews in Germany, readers were certainly 
aware of the increasing tension in Europe.  The day after Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of 
Germany, the Times printed several articles on the event.  One naively reported that his 
acceptance of the position was a rejection of his previously expressed desire to be a dictator, or 
as he called it,  “the Mussolini of Germany”.5  Later that year, following controversy over the 
approaching 1936 Olympics in Berlin, the Amateur Athletic Union, an organization responsible 
for certifying track-and-field athletes for the games, put forth a statement refusing to certify 
athletes unless German-Jewish athletes were allowed and encouraged to participate.  The Times 
responded with an article titled “AAU Boycotts 1936 Olympics Because of Nazi Ban on Jews” 
in a mischaracterization of the actual statement that portrayed the threat to boycott the Olympics 
as a real boycott.6  Despite the misleading title, here was an example of the newspaper reporting 
on an issue related to the Jewish condition in Germany and the controversy surrounding it.  Also, 
during the winter Olympics of 1936, which were also held in Germany, Frederick Birchall, a 
Times correspondent, wrote an article confirming the success of the Nazis in keeping their word 
on eliminating prejudice from the games.   At the end of the article, he wrote: 
This world gathering [the Winter Olympics] is not being used for any active propaganda . 
. . However, this is really the most efficient propaganda conceivable.  There is probably 
no tourist here who will not go home averring that Germany is the most peace-loving, 
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unmilitaristic, hospitable and tolerant country in Europe and that all the foreign 
correspondents stationed here are liars.7 
 
Some, such as David Clay Large, professor at Montana State University, have understood this 
statement to mean Birchall had been blinded to the real state of affairs in Germany because of 
the “Nazis’ ‘efficient propaganda’.” 8   However, Birchall’s statement was more likely an 
acknowledgment of the Nazi Olympics serving as merely a façade masking the true conditions in 
Germany.  
 Two other New York Times articles are also worth mentioning because they dealt 
specifically with Nazi anti-Semitism and Jewish issues.  The first was published in 1935 
following anti-Jewish riots in Germany.  Originally, it was stated by the Nazi government that 
the riots occurred because Jews had hissed at a Swedish film.  The article reported that Dr. Ernst 
Hanfstängl, Hitler’s press advisor, had admitted in secret that, on the contrary, Nazi Storm 
Troopers had been responsible for the hissing and had blamed it on the Jews.  The riots were said 
to be a “party affair” and quickly turned violent as participants attacked any Jews who crossed 
their path.9  Two days after this article appeared in the paper, another was published in which 
Rev. L. M. Birkhead reported on what he discovered while visiting Nürnberg, Germany.  He 
wrote that aside from their goal of eliminating “Jews from Germany’s cultural and political life,” 
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the Nazis were also working to spread anti-Semitism to other countries.10  These two articles 
demonstrate that the United States, by means of reports such as these, was indeed exposed to 
information regarding Jewish persecution and anti-Semitism in Germany.   
 In spite of the heavy focus on Nazi anti-Semitism in the previously mentioned articles, in 
1939, when several refugee ships from Germany sought refuge in the United States and other 
countries, The New York Times virtually ignored the fact that the majority of the refugees were 
Jewish.  The St. Louis was, possibly, the most widely known refugee ship.  A Times editorial 
characterized it as “the saddest ship afloat today, the Hamburg-American liner St. Louis, with 
900 Jewish refugees aboard, is steaming back toward Germany after a tragic week of frustration 
at Havana and off the coast of Florida.”11  Even after acknowledging that the ship carried 
primarily Jewish refugees, a few days later another editorial was published that dismissed this 
fact.  In discussing the problem of refugees from Germany, the editorial stated that, “it has 
nothing to do with race or creed.  It is not a Jewish problem or a Gentile problem . . . It is the 
problem of mankind.”12  As these reports show, The New York Times was critical of the Nazi 
government, yet it did at times fail to properly inform readers about the racial climate in 
Germany. 
 Another article that covered Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany was TIME magazine’s Man 
of the Year feature in 1939, for which Hitler was selected.  Contrary to the positive connotations 
                                                
10. Rev. L. M. Birkhead, “Nazis Ask World to Combat Jews: American Clergyman Learns Streicher’s 
Plans at Secret Office in Nuremberg. Links to U.S. Discovered: Rev. L. M. Birkhead of Kansas City Finds British 
Group Also Allied With Hitler’s Aide,” The New York Times, July 28, 1935, 2. 
 
11. “Refugee Ship,” The New York Times, June 8, 1939, 24. 
 
12. “‘Living Room’ For Germans,” The New York Times, July 22, 1939, 7. 
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of the title, he was selected for Man of the Year, 1938, because of how influential he was in 
international affairs.  He was heavily criticized in the piece.  It described him as a “moody, 
brooding, unprepossessing, 49-year-old Austrian-born ascetic with a Charlie Chapin mustache” 
who was “raised as a spoiled child” and “grew up a half-educated young man.”  Despite these 
characteristics, TIME recognized the fear he instilled in the world by threatening war over 
Czechoslovakia.  The article also mentioned his use of concentration camps for Jews, Socialists, 
Communists, and other dissidents.  It ended with a disturbingly accurate prediction: “It [seems] 
more than probable that the Man of 1938 may make 1939 a year to be remembered.”13  This 
article, thus, helps shed light on American sentiment towards Hitler and the Nazis.  It should also 
be noted that Life magazine was also very critical of the Third Reich.  This was likely due, at 
least in part, to the influence of cofounder and editor-in-chief of both magazines, Henry Luce, 
who was an active advocate of American intervention in Europe.14 
 In addition to newspaper and magazine articles, public opinion polls and surveys offer 
another measure of popular sentiment.  In 1935, the Gallup Poll was created by George Gallup to 
measure public opinion on a myriad of topics.  Along with questions about internal and domestic 
affairs, the polls also included questions about foreign affairs.  These questions are possibly the 
best indicator of American public opinion regarding the Third Reich. 
 Although foreign affairs questions were rarely asked more than once, the three that were 
asked on several different occasions help show the changing public opinions in the few years 
before World War II.  The first dealt with U.S. involvement in a foreign war.  It asked 
                                                
13. “Man of the Year,” TIME, January 2, 1939, 13-18. 
 
14. James L. Baughman, Henry R. Luce and the Rise of the American News Media (Boston: Twayne 
Publishers, 1987), 114-115. 
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respondents whether they thought the country would be drawn into a European war if there were 
to be one (this was generally stated or implied as a war between England and France on one side 
and Germany and Italy on the other).  This was first asked in 1936; over 60% answered “no.”  As 
more polls were taken, opinions changed and ultimately resulted in nearly 80% answering “yes” 
shortly before World War II began (Figure 1).15 
 The second question asked whether the people surveyed thought that there would be 
another large war in the near future.  These results showed no trends: the last poll had the highest 
percentage of respondents answering “no,” despite its greater chronological proximity to the start 
of the war (Figure 2).16  Of those who responded “yes” in the January, 1939 poll, however, the 
                                                




















Date of Survey 
If there were to be another European war, do 
you think the United States would be drawn in? 
Yes 
No 
Figure 1 Gallup Poll results.  Note: The specific wording of the question varied slightly based on when 
and how it was posed.  The results have been standardized for comparison. 
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majority believed Germany would be responsible for starting the future war.17  Overall, results in 
Figure 2 reflect a country divided on the seriousness of the conflicts in Europe. 
 
 
 Third, another Gallup poll asked whether the United States should send its military to 
Europe to help fight if a war were to break out between England and France on one side and 
Germany on the other (the hypothetical assumption was removed from the question after the war 
began).  Overwhelmingly, respondents answered no to this question.  After the war began, 
almost 95% of all those asked thought the United States should not send out its military (Figure 
3), though they increasingly favored assisting England and Britain by other means.18  Most 
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17. Ibid., 137. 
 




















Date of Survey 
Do you believe there will be a war between 
any of the big European countries this year? 
Yes 
No 
Figure 2 Gallup Poll results. 
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likely, this can be attributed to the economic troubles facing the country and to the bitter 
interpretation of World War I as a war the United States was tricked into entering by corrupt 
politicians and greedy military arms manufacturers.19  
 Finally, aside from these three questions, several other Gallup Polls proved significant.  
In May of 1938, 65% of people surveyed answered that they would support England and France 
if they were to go to war against Germany and Italy.  Only 3% would have favored Germany and 
Italy.20  Later, when asked if they believed Hitler when he said he had “no more territorial 
ambitions in Europe,” 92% of people did not believe him.21  In November of that same year, a 
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Date of Survey 




Figure 3 Gallup Poll results.  Note: The question in the first two polls was posed hypothetically if war 
were to break out.  The September 1939 poll was conducted following the start of the war on the first of 
September that same year. 
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Gallup poll asked about approval of “Nazi treatment of Jews in Germany.”  Only 6% approved, 
while 94% disapproved.22  Finally, in July of 1939, respondents were asked two questions: 1) 
“What country do you like least?” and 2) “Which foreign statesman do you least like?”  The top 
answers for both questions were Germany and Adolf Hitler, respectively.23 
In sum, although there is no exact way of determining what the American public knew 
and what their opinions were regarding Nazi Germany, analyzing newspaper and magazine 
articles and Gallup polls helps lead to an answer.  The New York Times and TIME articles prove 
that the events that took place in Nazi Germany during the 1930s were not well-kept secrets; 
even though the Times did not always fully address the situation, there was enough information 
available to the public for them to make informed judgments.  The Gallup polls, on the other 
hand, show that, in general, most Americans disapproved of Adolf Hitler and the Nazis but 
remained steadfast in their anti-war position. 
                                                
22. Ibid., 128. 
 












As the previous chapters show, although the United States in general did relatively little 
to take a collective stance for or against the Nazi government in Germany, its inaction was not 
due to a lack of information available.  On the whole, most Americans were strongly opposed to 
the Nazi regime and its policies, and they recognized Germany’s growing threat to peace and 
democracy.  Regardless, they disapproved of any direct involvement in European politics and 
believed the country should not be drawn into another war. 
 Information about Nazism and Adolf Hitler was more or less widely available, 
particularly in the late 1930s.  First, the entire set of ideas and plans that guided Hitler’s 
Germany had been published more than a full decade before the start of World War II in his 
semi-autobiographical book, Mein Kampf.  An English translation, while somewhat faulty, was 
in existence as early as 1933.  Second, many newspapers and magazines, including The New 
York Times, regularly published articles that covered Nazi Germany and its bellicosity and 
violence towards Jews, communists, and political opponents.  As reports of Jewish persecution 
emerged, anti-Nazi organizations helped raise awareness and voiced their opinions through 
protests, boycotts, and publications.  Third, the United States government had privileged access 
to information from their own officials stationed in Germany, such as Ambassador Dodd and 
George S. Messermith, and to information from the British and French governments. 
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 Within the United States government, the opinions paralleled those in the American 
public.  Most government officials sympathized with the Jews and other victims of the Nazi 
persecutions.  They also recognized the threat of Nazi Germany.  In spite of this, there was 
general opposition to war or direct action.  Even officials such as President Franklin Roosevelt, 
who would ultimately push for involvement in the European conflict, were hesitant to act.   
 In the general population, only a small percentage approved of the Nazi government.  The 
three figures that, arguably, had the most influence and ability to disseminate their ideas were 
Henry Ford, Father Charles Coughlin, and Charles Lindbergh.  Ford and Coughlin, as did most 
of the Nazi sympathizers, sympathized with the Nazis because of their anti-Semitic agenda and 
their hatred of communism.  Lindbergh, on the other hand, was primarily wooed over by the 
Nazi officials on his visits to Germany and was infatuated with their air force, the Luftwaffe. 
 The majority of the American public disliked Hitler and Nazi Germany.  They were 
against Nazi ideology and the Jewish persecutions.  They almost completely approved of indirect 
support of England and France by means of food and supplies.  Nonetheless, like the 
government, they overwhelmingly agreed that the United States should not wage war or send its 
troops to help in the European struggle. 
  The research in this thesis has given insight into how Nazi Germany was perceived 
before World War II.  It helps explain how much was known about the Third Reich at the time 
and how America responded.   
Further, this thesis also sheds light on an ongoing debate over America’s role in 
international affairs and the relationship between public opinion and government policy-making.  
Since its emergence from World War II as a world power, the United States has had significant 
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influence in international affairs.  However, primarily since the failure of the Vietnam War, the 
country’s role internationally has been brought into question.   In recent memory, the 
government has come under fire for its actions or inactions globally in places like Iraq, in Darfur, 
and Syria.  While there is certainly no clear-cut answer to when the United States should 
intervene itself in foreign affairs and to what degree, the research in this thesis suggests that, in 
spite of opposition by the American public, if there is enough verifiable evidence of a 
humanitarian crisis to justify intervention, the government should act.  Especially with hindsight, 
this certainly applies to World War II. 
As with most debates, though, this one cannot be easily resolved.  To make a better 
judgment, it would be beneficial to also research American opinions of World War II after the 
war had ended to gauge shifts in public opinion over foreign policy decisions.  This could be 
incorporated into a larger body of research on public opinion before and after other major wars 
and international conflicts in United States history.  Ultimately, the goal would be to try to find a 
general relationship between the views of the American public on foreign affairs and the decision 
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